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TAXATION-FEDERAL INCOME TAX-SALE OF UNMATURED CROP AS CAPIGAIN OR ORDINARY INCOME-Petitioner sold a farm owned over six months
upon which was a growing but unmatured wheat crop. When taxed upon the
amount of sale price apportionable to the crop as ordinary income, he contended
that under state law the land was a capital asset and that the growing crop was
an inseparable part thereof. He concluded, therefore, that the entire amount
should have been taxed a~ a capital gain. The purchaser testified that he had
considered the crop to be worth about $8,500 and that he had deducted this
amount in his own tax return as cost of the crop. The commissioner held that a
growing crop is not necessarily a capital asset and that the part of the payment
apportionable to the crop was ordinary income. On appeal to the Tax Court
of the United States, held, affirmed. The amount of gain from the sale of the
growing crop was properly treated as ordinary income, not capital gain, since
the crop was property held primarily for sale to customers. McCoy v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 828 (1950).
Under present tax law there are two advantages to be attained by the taxpayer if he can classify the sale of a growing crop as a sale of a capital asset held
over six months. First, only fifty per cent of the gain is taxed.1 Also, there is
a ceiling rate of fifty per cent on the amount taxed,2 so that, in effect, the maximum effective rate is only twenty-five per cent of the gain. Congress undoubtedly has the power to tax proceeds from the sale of growing unmatured crops as
ordinary income, regardless of how this property interest is characterized by local
law.8 Whether Congress has so exercised this power depends upon the interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code.4 The Tax Court of the United States
has held in both the principal case and in the Watson case,5 decided several days
TAL

l!.R.C. §ll7(b).
I.R.C. §117(c)(2).
Weiss v. Weiner, 279 U.S. 333, 49 S.Ct. 337 (1929); Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S.
103 at 110, 53 S.Ct. 74 (1932); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 at 80, 60 S.Ct. 424
(1940).
4 "Capital assets.-The term 'capital assets' means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not include-CA) stock in
trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the
inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business••••" I.R.C. §117(a)(l).
5 Watson v. Commissioner, 15 T.C. 800 (1950).
2
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earlier, that a growing crop is property held primarily for sale to customers in
the ordinary course of business, thus taxable as ordinary income, regardless of
whether or not under local law it is considered part of the land. A federal district court, on the other hand, decided in the Irrgang case that such a crop was
not held primarily for sale to customers;6 therefore, since at common law it was
considered part of the land, the entire sale price was capital gain. Although the
Watson and the Irrgang decisions involve sale of orchards including unripened
citrus fruit on the trees, the facts can readily be equated to those of the principal
case, since the trees are part of the land, and the fruit is comparable to an annual
wheat crop. The reasoning of the Tax Court in the Watson case, reaffirmed by
the principal case, is that, although the seller is not in the business of selling
green unsevered fruit, the fruit was held for eventual sale to customers and
for no other purpose. The Tax Court thereby distinguished two tax decisions
relied upon by the federal district court in the Irrgang case as authority for the
proposition that the entire sale price ought to be treated as proceeds from sale
of a capital asset. 7 Since any property owned by the taxpayer is a capital asset
unless specifically excluded by the Internal Revenue Code,8 it would seem that
once it is found that a growing crop does not come within the exception of property held for sale to customers, or some other exception, it should be taxable as
a capital asset whether it is real or personal property. The court in the Irrgang decision, therefore, relied unnecessarily upon the finding that the fruit
was part of the real estate in reaching the conclusion that the fruit was not to be
taxed as ordinary income. The muddy status of the common law as to when a
growing crop is a part of the real estate and when it is not indicates the desirability of reaching the court's conclusion without such a finding. 9 The approach
of the Tax Court is based upon the policy that the taxpayer should not be allowed to treat as a capital gain income from the sale of a crop which after maturity would be treated as ordinary income. 10 It is obvious that the crop was a major
consideration of the parties in reaching a final sale price; and they consciously,
if not expressly, dealt with the land and the crop as separate items. This consideration serves to point up the policy behind a treatment.of the crop as property
held primarily for sale to customers in ordinary business and also helps to answer
the problem of valuation presented by application of the Tax Court's view.
The buyer can be called upon to give evidence, as in the principal case, as to
how much of the consideration was intended as payment for the land_ and how
(D.C. Fla. 1950) 94 F. Supp. 206.
v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 467 (1944); Butler Consolidated Coal Co.
v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 183 (1946). These cases involved sales of land with standing
timber and unmined coal. In the Camp case the timber was held primarily to be manufactured into lumber and in the Butler case the coal mine had been abandoned for eleven
years prior to sale; consequently neither sale was held to be a sale of property held primarily
for sale to customers.
s I.R.C. §ll7(a)(l).
9 15 AM. JuR., Crops §§3, 4 (1938); 25 C.J.S., Crops §1 (1941). Watson v. Commissioner, supra note 5, at 808 et seq.
lO The dissent in Watson v. Commissioner, supra note 5, recognized that matured crops,
though unsevered, would be property held primarily for sale to customers.
6 Irrgang v. Fahs,
7 Camp Mfg. Co.
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much for the crop. It is submitted that the view of the Tax Court seems the
sounder of the two on policy grounds and can be made to fit fairly comfortably
within the provision of the code excluding from the definition of capital assets
goods held primarily for sale to. customers.
Alan C. Boyd, S. Ed.

